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Should Basic Underwriting Rules be Applied
to Average Crop Revenue Election and
Supplemental Revenue?
G. Art Barnaby, Jr.
This paper considers methods to adversely select on Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE)
and Supplemental Revenue (SURE). In the case of winter wheat, farmers had a large amount
of a priori yield and price information before electing 2009 ACRE. Prior to the August 14
sign-up for ACRE, wheat was 3 months into the marketing year. In most years nearly half of
the national average price is determined in the first 3 months of the marketing year. With this
available information it was clear that Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington wheat would
collect the maximum or near the maximum ACRE payment, while therewas little chance that
ACRE would pay on Colorado wheat.




(2008 Farm Bill) created two new farm revenue
safety net programs, SUpplemental REvenue
(SURE) and Average Crop Revenue Election
(ACRE). The argumentfor a farm policy change
that moved commodity programs from fixed
paymentstooneprovidingriskmanagementwas
led by Dr. Carl Zulauf, who first proposed the
concept of a tool to cover systemic risk (Reese,
2004; Zulauf, 2006). The Zulauf proposal
evolved into the ACRE program and the SURE
program was added primarily by Northern Plain
States small grain interests.
SURE is whole crop farm supplemental rev-
enue insurance that is designed to cover some of
the deductibles and other perils not covered in
the crop insurance program. Pasture and live-
stock revenue are not included in SURE but
it includes all other crops. ACRE payments re-
place many of the traditional farm program pay-
ments and ACRE payments are deducted from
any SURE payment. ACRE coverage applies to
a limited number of crops that include: wheat,
barley, oats, grain sorghum, corn, upland cotton,
rice (medium and long grain), soybeans, canola,
crambe, flaxseed, mustard seed, rapeseed, saf-
flower, sesame seed, sunflower seed, peanuts,
dry peas, lentils, and small and large chickpeas.
SURE includes all crops including nonprogram
crops.
Zulauf, Schnitkey, and Langemeier (2010)
provide a more detailed mathematical docu-
mentation of the ACRE and SURE payment
parameters. However, in general terms the
SURE guarantee for an insurable crop equals
planted acres times percent crop insurance
coverage times insurance price elected by the
grower times the higher of the crop insurance
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 2010 Southern Agricultural Economics Associationproven yield (Actual Production History) or the
SURE adjusted actual production history that
deletes all of the crop insurance plugs that
replaced ‘‘low’’ yields before averaging the
remaining ‘‘high’’ yields times 115% (120% for
2008 only). The SURE guarantee for non-
insurable crops that are covered under the
Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program
(NAP) equals planted acres times 50% of ap-
proved NAP yield times 50% of the NAP price
times 120% (125% for 2008 only). This for-
mula is repeated for all of the other crops and
then the total dollars guaranteed are summed
for the total SURE guarantee. There is a cap on
SURE coverage equal to 90% of the expected
total whole farm crop revenue. Farmers are
required to insure or pay NAP fees on all of
their crop acres to participate in SURE.
The revenue to countagainst the SURE guar-
anteeinclude:1)valueofallcropsproduced(har-
vested acres times yield times marketing year
average (MYA) price); 2) loan deficiency pay-
ments (LDP); 3) counter cyclical payments; 4)
Average Crop Revenue Election payments;
5)15% of direct payments; 6) net of farmer paid
premium cropinsurance indemnities; and7) NAP
payments. SURE then pays 60% of the difference
between the SURE guarantee and the revenue to
count, subject to a $100,000 payment limit. Farm
Service Agency (FSA) does not deduct private
insurance indemnity payments from the SURE
payment.
ACRE is an off board financial derivative
that provides some price protection across pro-
duction years tied to the state yield. Effectively,
ACRE is a ‘‘put option’’ on expected state rev-
enue (Chicago Board of Trade). The ACRE
revenue guarantee is the approved 5 year mov-
ing Olympic average state yield times the ap-
proved 2 year moving average price of the most
recent historical MYA prices times 90%. The
revenue to account against the ACRE guaran-
tee is the current year’s actual state yield times
the maximum of the current MYA price or 70%
of the loan rate. The maximum ACRE payment
is limited to 25% of the ACRE revenue guar-
anteed and has an effective payment limit of
$73,000.
If the state level ACRE payment is triggered,
then the farm level revenue must be less than the
farm level benchmark plus crop insurance pre-
miums in order for a farmer to collect the pay-
ment. The farm benchmark price is the same
approved ACRE 2 year moving average price of
the MYA prices and the farm level yield is
amoving5yearOlympicaverageofthefarmer’s
individual yields. The benchmark is set equal to
the farm’s benchmark price times the farmer’s
approved Olympic average yield, plus farmer
paid premiums. The farm level revenue to count
isthefarmer’syieldtimesthecurrentyear’sMYA
price. Farmers must have farm level revenue
belowthefarmlevelbenchmarktobeeligiblefor
ACRE payments. The farm benchmark test can
onlypreventanACREpayment;itcannottrigger
a payment. Farm revenue that is one dollar
greater than the farm benchmark will prevent an
ACRE payment.
ACRE has a 10% cup and cap on dollars of
revenue coverage. Unlike fixed loan rates, over
time ACRE coverage will increase or decrease
with the market. However, ACRE limits the
amount of annual change in coverage to 10% or
less.
Sign-up is by farm serial number and all
eligible crops must be enrolled. Both tenant
andlandlordmustagree on ACREenrollment.
The ACRE enrollment is attached to the land
and must remain in ACRE for the life of the
Farm Bill, even if tenant or land ownership
changes.
ACRE Costs
ACRE is effectively a ‘‘put option on expected
state revenue’’ for program crops only. This off
Board derivative operates similar to a Board
traded put option on the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME). What is fundamentally dif-
ferent is the effective ‘‘premium’’ rate does not
change with the risk. The ‘‘premium’’ cost for
ACRE is a 20% reduction in the direct pay-
ment, elimination of the counter cyclical pay-
ment, and a 30% reduction in the loan rate for
the remaining life of the 2008 Farm Bill. In
addition, 100% of the ACRE payment will be
deducted from any SURE payment. However,
unlike a market traded put option, the ‘‘pre-
mium’’ cost for ACRE is the same for a deep in
the money ACRE contract as it is for a far out
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1 For example, at
sign-up, ACRE on Oklahoma wheat provided a
deep in the money ‘‘put option on expected state
wheat revenue’’ for the same ‘‘premium’’ cost as
a far out of the money ‘‘put option on expected
state revenue for Colorado wheat’’. As a result
the participation cost for ACRE was underpriced
for Oklahoma wheat but very overpriced for
Colorado wheat. It is always possible for a deep
in the money ACRE contract to expire worthless,
but unlikely. The reverse is true for a far out of
the money ACRE contract.
It is assumed the cost for ACRE is 20% of
the direct payment for the remaining life of the
Farm Bill. This assumes that soybeans, feed-
grains, and wheat prices do not fall below the
payment trigger price in the counter cyclical
programnordopricesfallbelowtheloanrate.
2If
prices were to fall below the loan rate farmers
would give up counter cyclical payments and it
would require an additional 30% reduction in
pricestotriggerLDPpayments.Ifpriceswere to
fall below 70% of the loan rate farmers would
discover that ACRE has a stop lossequal to 25%
ofthecoverage.Veryfewanalysts expectmarket
prices for wheat (excluding specialty wheat like
durum), corn, sorghum, soybeans, or oilseeds
to fall below the payment trigger price in the
counter cyclical program unless there is a major
change in public policy on biofuels. If prices fall
below 70% of the loan rate, undoubtedly there
willbemanyfarmersinfinancialtroubleandthus
a high probability that public policy will change
toaddresstheissue.Therefore,itisreasonableto
assume the cost for participating in ACRE is
a 20% reduction in the direct payment for the
remaininglifeoftheFarmBillandwhiletheloss
of other payments is possible, it is not likely.
Is It Possible to Adversely Select on ACRE?
WoolvertonandYoung’s(2009)analysissuggests
that ACRE is worth the ‘‘premium’’ cost when
thereisnoaprioriinformationthatallowsfarmers
to adversely select on the program. The amount
of a priori information varies greatly from state
to state and crop to crop. The most a priori in-
formation was available to Southern Great Plains
winter wheat farmers. The National Agricultural
Statistics Service (NASS) had already published
four crop estimates for state wheat yields and
nearly 3 months of the marketing year had passed
before the August 14 sign-up deadline. By con-
trast, most feedgrain and soybean producers had
none of their crop harvested and the marketing
year did not start until 2 weeks after sign-up.
This a priori information available to Southern
Plains wheat producers will likely continue. The
next sign-up is scheduled for June 1. NASS will
issueitsfirststatewheatyieldestimatesinlateMay.
Also, winter wheat farmers in states located south
of Kansas may have some or all of their wheat
harvested. If the state yield is above the 5-year
Olympic average yield, then depending on market
prices, ACRE may be out of the money. The re-
verse situation will also be true where ACRE is in
the money, if the statewide winter wheat crop fails
but that will be known at sign-up on June 1, 2010.
Assuming the ACRE Olympic average Col-
orado wheat yield is lower than farmers’ expec-
ted 2010 state wheat yield, they will likely view
the 2010 Colorado wheat offer as an out of the
money ACRE offer. However, if the 2010 Colo-
radowheatcropisafailure,thatwouldlikelyput
ACRE in the money, even with the current yield
history. A statewide 2010 Colorado wheat crop
failure would be known by the June 1 sign-up
1The intrinsic value of an option is the difference
between strike price and the underlying market price of
the commodity. If the strike price is greater than the
underlyingmarketpriceofthecommodity,thentheoption
has intrinsic value and is referred to as an ‘‘in the money
option’’. If the option has no intrinsic value, then the
option is referred to as an ‘‘out of the money’’ option. In
additiontointrinsicvalue,optionsalsocontaintimevalue
andvolatilityvalue.Thetimevalueisbasedontheamount
of time remaining until the option period expires. The
volatilityisameasureoftheriskinthemarketstatedasthe
annualized standard deviation of percentage change in
daily prices. Often the value of an option is split between
intrinsic value and ‘‘time’’ value that includes the un-
derlying risk plus the remaining time to expiration.
2The counter cyclical payment is paid based on the
MYA price of all classes of wheat, but the loan rates
are set by county and class of wheat. As a result 2008/
2009 falling durum wheat prices triggered marketing
loan deficiency payments but not counter cyclical
payments that are tied to all classes of wheat MYA
price. As a further complication, marketing loan gains
have no effective payment limit. Durum wheat farmers
enrolled in the ACRE program will likely forgo any of
the LDP payments because the loan rate that will
trigger LDP payments was reduced by 30 percent.
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oradowheatfarmerstoadverselyselectandsign-
up for 2010 ACRE.
Multiple Annual State Yield Losses within
a State Will Cut ACRE Value
Another factor is the method for setting a 5-year
Olympic average. If the state has suffered mul-
tiple year crop losses, it may take several years
before the Olympic average yield will represent
farmers’ expected state yield. For example,
Colorado has three wheat yields below 25
bushels and it will take 2 years of good crops
beforeallthe2004,2005,and2006‘‘poor’’yields
aredroppedfromtheOlympicaverageusedtoset
the 2009 Colorado ACRE wheat offer (Table 1).
A 5-year moving average state Olympic
yieldcombinedwitha2-yearmovingaverageof
the MYA price will set the 2010 ACRE guar-
antee. The MYA is the average monthly NASS
cash prices that are weighted by sales volume.
In most years, about half of the MYA price for
wheat is determined in the first 3 months of the
marketing year because of the sales weights
(Table 2). Normally for sorghum half of the
MYApriceisnotdetermineduntiltheendofthe
fifth month. This is caused mostly by farmers
shifting sorghum sales to the new tax year.
On the June 1 sign-up, the 2009 state yields
will be nearly complete (NASS can adjust the
yield up to 2 years after first publishing, butany
change after June 1 will be ‘‘small’’). Colorado
wheatfarmerswillhavea2010Olympicyieldof
30.1 bushels, a 22.9% increase in yield (Table
1). Unless the ACRE 2 year average MYA price
is higher than the current forecast of $5.81,
Colorado wheat will not hit the 10% cap on
annual ACRE coverage changes. Assuming
a $5.81 ACRE price on 2010 wheat, Oklahoma
will hit the 10% cup that limits annual coverage
changes for ACRE because of the 2006 (23.6
bushels)yieldandthe2009(21.1bushels)yield.
Because ACRE uses a 5-year Olympic average
yield, one ofthose‘‘low’’ yieldswillbe retained
in the average until 2012.
By sign-up the price forecast should havevery
little error because it will be near the end of the
marketing year. NASS will have published 11
months of monthly wheat prices prior to June 1,
2010, therefore the forecasted 2009/2010 MYA
pricewillonlybemissingtheNASSpriceweights




be averaged with the 2008/2009 final MYA price
to set the 2010 ACRE 2-year average MYA price.
Forecasting the 2-year average MYA price
for the 2011 ACRE wheat contract prior to June
1, 2010 will be difficult but one can place up-
ward and lower bounds on the ACRE Olympic
yield for the following year’s sign-up on June 1,
2011. For example if one assumes the 2010
Colorado yield exceeds the 5-year Olympic
average yield, then the 2011 Colorado Olympic
average wheat yield will be approximately 35.6
bushels.Ifoneassumesthe2010Coloradoyield
is below the 5-year Olympic averageyield, then
the2011ColoradoOlympicaveragewheatyield
will be approximately 29.1 bushels. Both the
upperboundandthelowerboundestimateofthe
5-year Olympic average will exceed the 2009
ACRE Olympic average yield of 24.5 because
the2004 (21.5bushels) and 2005(23.3 bushels)
yields will drop out of the average in 2011. The
2011 Olympic average yield is an approxima-
tion only because the 2009 yield includes an
estimate of the FSA determined failed acres for
wheat and sorghum (Table 1).
Adverse Selection after ACRE Sign-up
Once farmers elect ACRE they are in the pro-
gram for the remaining life of the 2008 Farm
Bill.Thisprogram‘‘underwriting’’ruleremoves
most adverse selection based on a priori in-
formation during the remaining years of the
Farm Bill. If farmers were allowed to annually
make the decision toelect ACREversus 20% of
their direct payment then the adverse selection
would be more pronounced.
The multiyear enrollment does not eliminate
alladverseselection,however.Farmerswhoplant
acres beyond their base must pick the crops that
will receive the ACRE payment. In addition,
farmers are not required to plant the same crop
each year. Because ACRE is by farm serial
number, farmers who do not sign-up all farm se-
rialnumberswillretainplantingflexibilitytotake
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by planting in the money ACRE crops on farm
serial numbered farms enrolled in ACRE while
plantingcropswithlittleexpectationofanACRE
payment on farm serial numbered farms that are
notenrolledinACRE.Basedoncurrentyieldand
price estimates, farmers will be able to select the
crops for payment or determine the crops to be
planted that will generate the highest ACRE
payment. Generating the largest ACRE payment
will not be the only consideration when making
planting decisions. However, farmers who have
planted over their base acres will select the crops
to receive the ACRE payment and that will en-
courage farmers to adversely select on ACRE.
Selecting crops for payments will not occur prior
toAugustandthisincreasestheamountofapriori
information for making the selection. These an-
nual planting and crop selection for payment de-
cisions will allow farmers to continue adversely
selecting on ACRE after they have enrolled.
Does ACRE Have Some Overlap with the Crop
Insurance Program?
Zulauf, Schnitkey, and Langemeier (2010)
documented the overlap between ACRE and
crop insurance. If one accepts this argument of
overlap, then by definition there is some level
of competition between ACRE and crop in-
surance. This overlap is primarily caused by
price risk being covered to some extent in both
the revenue insurance and the ACRE programs.
The overlap in crop insurance and ACRE
payments may be less than policymakers have
assumed. Examining the previous 5 years of
crop insurance average payments per claim
acre demonstrates for the states of Kansas,
Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington wheat, most
of the risk protection was provided by crop
insurance. The average payment per claim acre
for those wheat states was approximately $50–
$65 per acre over the 5-year period. During this
same time frame there would have been only
two ACRE payments made to wheat growers in
these four states. Texas would have generated
a $21.77 ACRE payment in 2006. During the
same year crop insurance would have provided
Texas wheat farmers with a $50.33 average
paymentperinsurance claimacre.Kansaswheat
farmers would have received an ACRE payment
of $9.62 in 2004. During this same year Kansas
wheatfarmersreceivedanaverageperclaimacre
crop insurance payment of $58.17 (Table 3).
Historically there were many years of signif-
icant payments under crop insurance that would
not have generated any ACRE payments in these
wheat states. This would suggest that crop in-
surance will continue to be the primary risk
managementtool,butwiththeabilitytoadversely
select on ACRE, farmers can significantly add
revenue to their farm.
The expected ACRE payment for 2009
Oklahomawheat($46.84),Texaswheat($42.96),
and Washington wheat ($91.00) are expected to
be at the maximum. The exception is Kansas
wheretheACREpaymentisprojectedtobesmall
or perhaps no payment for 2009 (Table 4).
A Method to Reduce Overlap with Crop Insurance
One possible method for reducing any overlap
between ACRE and crop insurance is to allow
farmers to delete the revenue endorsement, but
retaintheyieldreplacementendorsementintheir
crop insurance contract. The Risk Management
Agency (RMA) isgoing toreplace the insurance
contractsthatinclude:ActualProductionHistory
(APH), Income Protection, Revenue Assurance,
and Crop Revenue Coverage with a new ‘‘APH’’
(renamed Combo, and may be renamed again)
that will include a Revenue Endorsement (RE)
that is a yield adjusted Asian put option and
a Yield ReplacementEndorsement (YRE) that is
a yield adjusted Asian call option.
3 Farmers will
3An option traded on the Chicago Board of Trade
that was acquired by the CME gives the option owner
the right to excise the option and the contract is settled
when closed out based on the spot market. An Asian
option has no right to be exercised, so only intrinsic
value is captured, and they are settled on an average
price at expiration rather than the spot market. The
CME option is based on a fixed 5,000 bushels and
yield has no effect on the value of the option. That is
also true for an Asian option. However, the Asian
options that create the revenue and yield replacement
endorsements are adjusted for yield when added to the
crop insurance contract. Farmers can produce their
way out of a claim on a yield adjusted Asian option, so
that the option will expire worthless, even when
a CME option with the same strike price expires with
intrinsic value.
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retain the RE endorsement, but they are not
allowed to do the reverse and exclude the RE
endorsementandretaintheYREendorsement.If
farmers were allowed to exclude the RE en-
dorsementandretaintheYREendorsement,then
there would be reduced overlap on the price risk
covered by ACRE. The overlap on yield risk
Table 1. Historical 5-Year Olympic Average Yields for ACRE in Selected Wheat and Corn States
a
























































79 23.6 20.7 37.0 28.9 37.6 25.7
80 32.1 21.8 5.3% 34.5 30.8 6.6% 29.8 27.7 7.8%
81 26.9 23.9 9.6% 24.0 30.5 (1.0%) 26.7 27.8 0.4%
82 27.3 26.0 8.8% 34.6 32.7 7.2% 32.8 29.8 7.2%
83 34.5 28.8 10.8% 38.4 35.3 8.0% 32.9 31.8 6.7%
84 32.3 30.6 6.3% 36.3 35.1 (0.6%) 35.0 31.8 0.0%
85 38.8 31.4 2.6% 37.4 36.1 2.8% 29.2 31.6 (0.6%)
86 30.9 32.6 3.8% 32.0 36.1 0.0% 28.3 31.6 0.0%
87 33.7 33.5 2.8% 36.5 36.7 1.7% 26.1 30.1 (4.7%)
88 32.9 33.0 (1.5%) 33.6 35.5 (3.3%) 35.0 30.8 2.3%
89 24.4 32.5 (1.5%) 19.7 34.0 (4.2%) 26.6 28.0 (9.1%)
90 33.1 32.3 (0.6%) 39.7 34.0 0.0% 31.7 28.9 3.2%
91 30.2 32.0 (0.9%) 32.6 34.2 0.6% 26.2 28.2 (2.4%)
92 29.5 30.9 (3.4%) 33.1 33.1 (3.2%) 28.2 28.8 2.1%
93 36.4 30.9 0.0% 34.4 33.4 0.9% 28.5 27.8 (3.5%)
94 29.2 30.9 0.0% 37.8 35.1 5.1% 26.5 27.7 (0.4%)
95 38.1 32.0 3.6% 25.7 33.4 (4.8%) 20.3 27.0 (2.5%)
96 28.8 31.7 (0.9%) 25.4 31.1 (6.9%) 17.5 25.0 (7.4%)
97 32.3 32.6 2.8% 45.9 32.6 4.8% 31.8 25.1 0.4%
98 39.2 33.2 1.8% 48.9 36.5 12.0% 38.9 26.2 4.4%
99 42.5 36.5 9.9% 46.5 39.4 7.9% 34.4 28.8 9.9%
00 29.4 33.6 (7.9%) 36.6 43.0 9.1% 33.2 33.1 14.9%
01 30.2 33.9 0.9% 36.1 43.0 0.0% 30.4 33.1 0.0%
02 18.3 32.9 (2.9%) 30.5 39.8 (7.4%) 25.9 32.7 (1.2%)
03 31.1 30.2 (8.2%) 47.8 39.8 0.0% 38.6 32.7 0.0%
04 21.5 27.0 (10.6%) 34.2 35.6 (10.6%) 34.5 32.7 0.0%
05 23.3 25.0 (7.4%) 39.9 36.7 3.1% 31.9 32.2 (1.5%)
06 20.5 21.8 (12.8%) 31.8 35.3 (3.8%) 23.6 30.7 (4.7%)
07 38.2 25.3 16.1% 32.6 35.5 0.6% 27.8 31.4 2.3%
08 28.7 24.5 (3.2%) 39.2 35.3 (0.6%) 36.9 31.4 0.0%
09 39.9 30.1 22.9% 41.7 37.2 5.4% 21.1 27.7 (11.8%)
Maximum Change 22.9% 12.0% 14.9%
Minimum Change (12.8%) (10.6%) (11.8%)
Average Change 1.5% 1.0% 0.4%
2011 ACRE’s 5-Yr Olympic Avg. Yield Assuming 2010 Yield Exceeds 5-Yr Olympic Avg.
35.6 15.4% 37.8 1.6% 29.4 5.8%
2011 ACRE’s 5-Year Olympic Average Yield Assuming a 2010 Crop Failure
29.1 (3.4%) 34.5 (7.8%) 24.1 (14.9%)























































125.6 96.1 125.6 109.6 114.9 104.2
108.6 103.2 7.4% 92.0 106.2 (3.1%) 112.9 107.5 3.2%
124.2 115.3 11.7% 124.3 112.5 5.9% 95.8 107.5 0.0%
118.9 118.8 3.0% 129.6 116.8 6.5% 113.9 110.5 2.8%
85.2 117.2 (1.3%) 76.4 114.0 (4.8%) 79.8 107.5 (2.7%)
111.4 113.0 (3.6%) 112.6 109.6 (3.9%) 117.9 107.5 0.0%
125.8 118.2 4.6% 133.9 122.2 11.5% 129.9 109.2 1.6%
134.9 118.7 0.4% 134.0 125.4 2.6% 127.9 119.6 9.5%
129.8 122.3 3.0% 131.4 126.0 0.5% 119.9 121.6 1.7%
82.7 122.3 0.0% 71.3 126.0 0.0% 84.8 121.6 0.0%
117.7 124.5 1.8% 122.7 129.3 2.6% 116.8 121.2 (0.3%)
125.6 124.4 (0.1%) 126.1 126.7 (2.0%) 120.9 119.2 (1.7%)
116.9 120.1 (3.5%) 106.3 118.4 (6.6%) 95.8 110.8 (7.0%)
147.0 120.1 0.0% 148.6 118.4 0.0% 142.8 111.2 0.4%
76.5 120.1 0.0% 124.4 124.4 5.1% 109.9 115.8 4.1%
151.9 129.8 8.1% 155.6 133.0 6.9% 138.9 123.2 6.4%
122.9 128.9 (0.7%) 112.9 128.6 (3.3%) 121.0 123.2 0.0%
137.8 135.9 5.4% 135.0 136.0 5.8% 110.4 123.4 0.2%
138.0 132.9 (2.2%) 128.7 129.4 (4.9%) 133.7 121.7 (1.4%)
144.5 140.1 5.4% 140.4 134.7 4.1% 141.0 131.2 7.8%
148.8 140.1 0.0% 139.8 134.5 (0.1%) 126.0 126.9 (3.3%)
144.0 142.2 1.5% 150.7 138.4 2.9% 146.9 133.5 5.2%
145.5 144.7 1.8% 151.8 143.6 3.8% 137.9 137.5 3.0%
162.9 146.3 1.1% 134.1 143.6 0.0% 88.9 134.9 (1.9%)
157.0 150.4 2.8% 163.1 147.4 2.6% 155.5 136.9 1.5%
180.6 155.1 3.1% 179.2 155.2 5.3% 157.7 146.8 7.2%
172.9 164.3 5.9% 142.9 152.6 (1.7%0 142.9 145.5 (0.9%)
166.0 167.3 1.8% 162.9 156.3 2.4% 158.9 152.1 4.5%
170.9 169.9 1.6% 175.0 167.0 6.8% 150.0 154.4 1.5%
169.4 171.1 0.7% 176.9 171.6 2.8% 134.9 150.2 (2.7%)




174.3 1.8% 175.3 2.6% 158.2 4.8%
168.8 (1.4%) 170.7 0.0% 147.9 (1.8%)
aSource: National Agricultural Statistical Service’s website: www.nass.usda.gov.
b ACRE uses the NASS published total yield state yield divided by total state harvested acres adjusted for FSA determined failed
acres for determining thewheat and cornyield in ACRE. FSA determines theACRE yield forcrops and states that do not publish
a NASS yield.
cThe moving 5-year Olympic average yield deletes the highest and lowest yield from the FSA failed acre adjusted NASS yields
and then averages the remaining yields for a 3 year average.
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at the state level, while most revenue insurance
contractsmeasureyieldlossatthefarmlevel,and
nothing greater than the county level.
By allowing farmers to delete the RE en-
dorsement they can reduce their premium cost
and be protected from falling prices by the
ACRE program. But many farmers would want
to retain YRE endorsement that turns APH
coverage from a ‘‘yield’’ guarantee to a yield
replacement guarantee. Farmers who need grain
for feed would need to replace the lost grain at
current market value, not a forecasted price set
6–9 months earlier. Also grain that is under
forward contract will need to be replaced at
current market value. In addition, all crop in-
surance contracts have deductibles so those
bushels will not be indemnified. Under some
conditions part of the insurance deductible will
becoveredwithSURE,butunderthescenarioof
higher prices, that will reduce any financial help
from SURE.
If farmers were allowed to eliminate the RE
endorsement but retain the YRE endorsement,
Table 2. Historical NASS Weights and Monthly Prices for Wheat and Grain Sorghum
NASS Monthly Wheat Prices and Historical Weights
a
2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009
Month Price Weight Price Weight Price Weight Price Weight Price Weight
Jun 3.55 10.9% 3.23 11.9% 3.98 16.0% 5.03 12.0% 7.62 11.4%
Jul 3.37 12.4% 3.20 16.8% 3.88 18.5% 5.17 27.0% 7.15 21.8%
Aug 3.27 9.0% 3.24 13.4% 3.91 12.6% 5.64 18.7% 7.61 14.9%
Sep 3.36 11.0% 3.36 11.7% 4.06 6.9% 6.76 9.4% 7.43 7.8%
Oct 3.43 7.0% 3.43 6.3% 4.59 9.1% 7.65 4.5% 6.65 3.8%
Nov 3.46 7.8% 3.45 4.7% 4.59 4.8% 7.39 3.8% 6.29 3.2%
Dec 3.40 8.6% 3.53 8.1% 4.52 6.8% 7.71 5.9% 5.95 6.9%
Jan 3.43 9.7% 3.52 8.4% 4.53 8.2% 7.96 7.8% 6.20 7.4%
Feb 3.36 9.5% 3.66 6.2% 4.71 5.1% 10.10 3.9% 5.79 4.3%
Mar 3.42 7.1% 3.79 5.1% 4.75 4.9% 10.50 3.1% 5.71 6.6%
Apr 3.35 3.4% 3.81 3.4% 4.89 4.2% 10.10 2.0% 5.75 5.3%
May 3.31 3.6% 4.09 4.0% 4.88 2.9% 8.87 1.8% 5.84 6.6%
NASS Monthly Grain Sorghum Prices and Historical Weights ($/bu)
a
2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009
Month Price Weight Price Weight Price Weight Price Weight Price Weight
Sep 2.00 5.0% 1.91 7.1% 2.40 4.1% 3.46 8.1% 4.47 3.9%
Oct 1.78 7.4% 1.67 9.4% 2.89 12.2% 3.46 13.7% 3.86 3.1%
Nov 1.71 15.2% 1.58 19.1% 3.26 23.2% 3.51 19.8% 3.63 11.4%
Dec 1.67 17.3% 1.63 15.9% 3.41 9.6% 3.88 15.4% 2.87 17.2%
Jan 1.65 13.8% 1.77 13.8% 3.53 12.2% 4.14 14.9% 3.18 15.1%
Feb 1.66 10.2% 1.90 7.0% 3.89 7.7% 4.68 6.3% 2.82 7.3%
Mar 1.70 5.7% 1.98 5.1% 3.63 1.5% 5.06 4.6% 3.00 13.0%
Apr 1.66 3.8% 2.07 5.2% 3.34 1.0% 5.21 4.0% 3.12 6.0%
May 1.71 3.1% 2.25 4.3% 3.63 1.6% 5.22 2.1% 3.35 9.1%
Jun 2.11 6.4% 2.21 1.7% 3.42 5.1% 5.66 3.1% 3.52 3.4%
Jul 2.21 6.8% 2.58 6.7% 3.09 7.8% 5.07 4.5% 2.91 5.4%
Aug 2.07 5.3% 2.44 4.7% 3.32 13.9% 4.70 3.5% 3.01 5.1%
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistical Service’s website; www.nass.usda.gov.
a Historical NASS Yields and prices are published annually. The current marketing year average prices are updated monthly.
After the marketing year ends, NASS will publish the weights. The wheat weights will be published in July and the fall crop
weights will be published in September. NASS calculates the weights based on the percentage of the total crop sold in a single
month. Those prices with higher weights have the greatest impact on the final MYA price.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Barnaby: Underwriting Applied to ACRE and SURE 527then overlap would be less than under current
policy. The APH price election is fixed, so if the
price election is $4 and the market drops to $3,
thenindemnifiedbushelswillbepaidat$4rather
thanatmarketvalueof$3.Assuminga75%APH
contract and a yield below 75% of the actual
production history, then the insurance value is
greater than the crop value. This is one of the
reasons why revenue insurance reduces moral
hazard because a yield loss below the deductible
is not required to receive indemnity payments
under revenue insurance when prices fall. So if
this farm does not suffer a yield loss greater than
thedeductible,thendeletingtheREendorsement
but retaining the YRE endorsement will reduce
most of the overlap with ACRE.
The real issueisAPH is not a yield guarantee
but a yield triggered payment. A real yield
guaranteewouldreplacethelostinsurablebushel
at current market. That means when price falls
atrueyieldguaranteewouldindemnifybushelsat
a lower price.
Creating ACRE overlap without the RE en-
dorsement on crop insurance will require three
conditions to be met. The first condition is a re-
quirement for an insurable yield loss. If this
condition is not met, then there is no overlap
with ACRE. Nationally about 19% of the APH
insurance units had claims and all APH claims
require an insurable yield loss (Table 5). Once
this condition of lost yield has been met a sec-
ond condition of a price decline must be met. If
the first two conditions are met then the third
condition requires the ACRE payment to ex-
ceed the deductible in the insurance contract
before there would be an ACRE overlap with
crop insurance.
Eliminating RE endorsement will not reduce
all possible overlap. There are some possible
strange outcomes because crop insurance uses
futures prices while ACRE uses MYA prices for
price discovery. It is doubtful that very many in-
suredfarmerswouldwanttowaitayearforacrop
insurance payment so it is unlikely both ACRE
and crop insurance will ever use the same price
discovery. As a result one might get a strange
marketingyearwherethechangeinfuturesprices
decreases while the MYA price increases above
the 2-year strike price. The two price discoveries
running in opposite directions will likely account
for only a very small amount of overlap.
Theremayalsobeagapincoveragecausedby
eliminating the revenue endorsement. For exam-
ple,ACREisunlikelytotriggera‘‘large’’payment
on 2009 Kansas wheat, while paying the maxi-
mum on Oklahoma wheat. Kansas farmers with
freeze damaged wheat will not be compensated
for the price decline without the revenue en-
dorsement.However,iftheyareasingleenterprise
wheat farmer with freeze damage, then some of







% of APH Contracts
with Claims
a
2008 835,332 143,638 17.2%
2007 870,656 156,885 18.0%
2006 933,181 203,499 21.8%
2005 1,096,241 157,004 14.3%
2004 1,063,840 158,204 14.9%
2003 1,269,105 281,464 22.2%
2002 1,494,436 403,719 27.0%
2001 1,572,288 310,572 19.8%
2000 1,847,282 351,618 19.0%
1999 1,908,383 321,331 16.8%
Ten Year Average APH Claim Rate 19.1%
Source: States Department of Agriculture, Risk Management Agency website: www.rma.usda.gov.
a An APH requires a yield to be less than the guaranteed bushels to trigger a payment. Revenue insurance can trigger an
indemnity caused by falling prices. It does not require a yield loss to trigger a claim. By evaluating just the APH contracts it
provides some insight into the amount of crop insurance risk that is caused yield only.
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2010 528thelosswouldbecoveredunderSURE.Thenetof
premium crop insurance payments are deducted
from the SURE guarantee but insured farmers
are compensated with higher SURE coverage
in return for purchasing higher levels of crop
insurance.
United States Department of Agriculture
could reduce adverse selection on ACRE by
changing the following underwriting rules: 1)
change sign-up from June 1 to September 30 of
the prior year, the same date as sales close for
winter wheat crop insurance; 2) require all farm
serialnumbersbesignedupinACREratherthan
allow farmers to select only parts of the farm to
enroll; 3) eliminate selecting crops for payment
and prorate the ACRE payment across all crops
when planted over base; and 4) reduce ACRE-
crop insurance overlap by allowing farmers to
delete the RE endorsement but retain the YRE
endorsement in the new ‘‘Combo’’ crop insur-
ance policy, scheduled for the fall of 2010.
Across Year Price Risk
One of the major risks not covered by crop in-
surance is price risk across production years.
Revenue insurance only covers price risk within
the production year. This is further complicated
by the fact that individual farmers can produce
their way out of a revenue insurance claim even
when prices drop substantially. In addition,
when prices fall, typically the crop insurance
guarantee for the next insurance cycle will be
lower caused by a lower price set at planting
time. This lower guarantee may not be sufficient
to cover production cost but one must remember
production cost can change too. Recent exam-
ples include substantial changes in fertilizer
prices combined with reductions in cash rents.
National Yield Based ACRE, a Crop Insurance
Compliment?
TheoriginalACREproposalcombinedanational
2-year average strike price with the national crop
yield (Zulauf, 2007). If ACRE had used the na-
tional yield there would have been very little
overlap with crop insurance. The justification
for a national yield based ACRE program was
to remove the systemic risk. There was no
requirementforindividualfarmerstoalsoshow
a revenue loss nor should there be because the
policywasdesignedtoremovethesystemicrisk
that is common to all farmers. Because the na-
tionalyieldvarieslessthanthestateyields,more
of the ACRE payment would have been driven
by price changes from the 2-year average na-
tional MYA price. At the extreme, if there were
no variation in the national yield, ACRE would
collapse into a put option on price only. A less
variable national yield than state yield could be
compensated for by simply lowering the de-
ductible on ACRE versus the current level of
a 10% deductible.
County Yield Based ACRE Would Compete
with Crop Insurance
During the debate there were suggestions to
replace the national yield with county yield
(Babcock and Paulson, 2007). If the county
yield had been used, then ACRE would effec-
tively be a nearly ‘‘free’’ Group Risk Income
Protection (GRIP) crop insurance contract. A
‘‘free’’ ACRE program based on county yields
wouldhavegreatlyreducedthedemandforcrop
insurance. Many farmers would simply see the
county-based ACRE program providing them
with an effective minimum level of coverage. It
would have also increased the cost to taxpayers
for ACRE.
The exception would be for farmers not
growing program crops or those who are sub-
stantially over the payment limit. The original
ACRE proposal had no payment limits, but that
was a very unlikely scenario. Because crop in-
surance does not have payment limits, large
farmers might have continued with their crop
insurance contract, but perhaps at a reduced
coverage level when combined with a county-
basedACREprogram.Nonprogramcropfarmers
would likely continue to purchase crop insur-
ance but the program crops represent 69.3%
of the premium earned in 2008 (Table 6). The
Administrative andOperating (A&O)expense is
apercentageofthepremiumpaidtotheinsurance
companies. This is the primary source of funds
used topaycropinsuranceagents’commissions.
A significant loss of a crop insurance market for
Barnaby: Underwriting Applied to ACRE and SURE 529program crops caused by an enhanced ACRE
programwouldalsocauseasignificantreduction
in the A&O.
In the political process compromises are
normally reached and in this case national yield
was replaced with state level yield. In addition
there was a 25% of coverage (liability) limit
placed on the maximum payment. By contrast,
crop insurance will pay out the entire coverage
with a zero yield and a maximum price increase
that is two times the base price election. An
additional requirement was added that requires
theindividualfarmertoalsoshowarevenueloss
in order to collect an ACRE payment. The farm
level benchmark trigger can only prevent a
payment, it cannot trigger a payment. An indi-
vidual farm loss is not required to collect from
a GRIP insurance contract.
Commodity groups were also lobbying for
a limit on the annual reduction in the ACRE
guaranteebetweenyears.Asaresult,theannual
maximumreductionintheACREguaranteewas
cupped at 10%. As a compromise, the annual
maximum increase in the ACRE guarantee was
also capped at 10%.
By changing to a state yield based ACRE
contract, the results are dramatically different
between states. It also added to the FSA admin-
istrative cost of the program over that required to
run an ACRE program based on national yields.
There are some states that have limited program
crop acres but still qualify for a state yield split
by irrigated versus nonirrigated acres. However,
NASSonlypublishescombinedyieldsforsmaller
acreage states. Examples include no published
NASS irrigated corn yields for Arkansas and
Delaware. If NASS does not split the yield be-
tween dryland and irrigated, then FSA will de-
terminetheyield.Thislackofdatawillbeanissue
in any state where there are only a small number
of the acres planted to a program crop. For ex-
ample, mustard seed is not widely planted. This
would have been an even bigger issue if county
yields had been used. Recently RMA eliminated
Table 6. Percent of Total Crop Insurance Book Generated from Program Crops
Crop
Policies Earn





Soybeans 463,382 61,172,875 22,215,145,528 2,608,919,372 2,872,613,273 1.10
Wheat 289,346 48,837,832 8,741,161,362 1,593,962,286 1,146,185,400 0.72
Corn 275,001 33,652,126 17,997,416,975 1,534,687,716 1,214,438,863 0.79
Cotton 81,836 8,807,013 2,345,846,941 397,674,306 565,940,105 1.42
Grain
sorghum
158,611 5,406,468 976,329,955 200,039,812 154,597,744 0.77
Sesame seed 66,961 2,119,830 582,104,093 120,796,341 119,314,041 0.99
Sunflowers 15,059 2,119,830 582,104,093 120,796,341 119,314,041 0.99
Barley 56,442 2,986,714 562,789,728 77,530,569 45,264,104 0.58
Peanuts 21,351 1,399,427 581,986,316 59,186,011 30,814,307 0.52
Canola 16,933 964,016 281,897,111 47,656,485 39,594,129 0.83
Rice 14,481 2,118,698 700,764,624 32,542,461 15,858,675 0.49
Dry peas 15,059 998,510 164,648,273 21,277,820 26,066,632 1.23
Oats 51,962 536,225 50,456,248 9,263,149 7,518,139 0.81
Flaxseed 17,440 328,550 62,385,647 8,314,548 8,401,002 1.01
Mustard seed 2,345 59,274 15,022,869 2,367,569 5,714,656 2.41
Safflower 3,546 112,556 13,397,842 2,010,617 1,642,210 0.82
Total program
crops
1,549,755 171,619,944 55,873,457,605 6,837,025,403 6,373,277,321 0.93




79.2% 63.0% 62.2% 69.4% 73.6%
Source: Risk Management Agency website: www.rma.usda.gov.
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2010 530theGRIPandGroupRiskPlancontractsinalarge
number of counties because of the lack of county
data. The lack of sales may also have been a rea-
son too. In any case using national yield would
have eliminated those data issues.
Debate on Using 2008 Price in 2009 ACRE
During the 2008 debate on how to implement
the ACRE program, 2008 corn futures prices
were trading over six dollars. The assumption
was the ACRE guarantee would be very high in
the first year, causing large numbers of farmers
to sign-up for ACRE and creating large gov-
ernment outlays. The argument was whether to
use the 2006/2007 and 2007/2008 MYA prices
or the 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 MYA prices to
set the 2-year average MYA price in 2009
ACRE. The argument for using 2006/2007 and
2007/2008 MYA prices was based on the fact
that the 2-year MYA average price would be
final causing the ACRE guarantee to be final at
sign-up. However, with the corn market trading
at record levels, commodity groups were push-
ing to use the 2008/2009 MYA price and that
was finally adopted. As a result, farmers do not
know the ACRE guarantee when they sign-up.
The market declined prior to setting the 2009
ACRE guarantee and the advantage for using
the 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 MYA prices was
not as large as expected. During the early sum-
mer of 2008 with the corn market trading at new
highs, many analysts and policy makers were
assuming a very ‘‘high’’ 2009 ACRE guarantee.
They were assuming most farmers would elect
ACRE and the ACRE payments would be very
large. It is now clear that none of this is likely to
be true. Most farmers did not elect ACRE, the
price decline will likely be less than their fore-
casts, and some states produced yields that were
greater than their 5-year Olympic average yield.
The ACRE participation is provided in Table 7
and the current estimated ACRE payments are
provided in Tables 4 and 8.
SURE is Complement of Crop Insurance
SURE is a whole farm revenue insurance guar-
antee that will provide supplemental coverage
addedtofarmers’cropinsurancecontracts.SURE
covers all crops, not just the program crops.
SURE Participation Cost
The cost for farmers to participate in SURE is
the requirement that all crops must be insured.
For farmers who currently insure all of their
crops and pay the NAP fees to FSA for crops
that do not have a reinsured contract, one could
argue SURE is effectively ‘‘free’’. Noninsured
farmers will need to pay additional crop in-
surance premiums and NAP fees to gain eligi-
bility for SURE.
TheSUREprogramcoversthe2008cropbut
few payments have been made as of this date.
The crop insurance sales closing date for 2008,
2009, and 2010 crops have already passed. Be-
cause these insurance dates have passed, some
farmers havealready eliminated theireligibility
for SURE payments on their crops for the first 3
years of the 2008 Farm Bill.
The SURE program is a complement to the
crop insurance program and is tied directly to
the coverage level of crop insurance purchased.
The higher level of crop insurance purchased in
most cases, the higher the level of SURE cov-
erage, up to a cap on benefits that cannot ex-
ceed 90% of expected farm revenue.
No SURE Overlap with ACRE and
Crop Insurance
SURE caps payments from all revenue sources
to 90% of whole farm expected revenue, but
with the deductible and crop insurance pre-
miums, the chances of any overlap with ACRE
and SURE is greatly reduced. If farmers com-
bine net of premium crop insurance payments
and the value of the crop exceeds the 90% cap,
then the SURE payment is reduced. Any ACRE
payment is also deducted from SURE.
OklahomawheatfarmerswhoelectedACRE
in many cases will receive reduced SURE pay-
mentsbecauseoftheACREpaymenthittingthe
maximum payment equal to 25% of the ACRE
guarantee. Single enterprise Oklahoma wheat
farmers, who are under the payment limit, will
receive more from ACRE than they would have
received under SURE, but the difference will
Barnaby: Underwriting Applied to ACRE and SURE 531likely be less than many farmers expect. Those
Oklahoma single enterprise wheat farmers who
are over the payment limit and suffered freeze
damagewill likely collect from both ACRE and
SURE.
Adverse Selection on SURE
The adverse selectiononSURE may beminimal
however it is not impossible. For example corn-
soybean farmers could change their planting
practices from 50 to 50 corn and soybeans to all
corn1yearfollowedbyallsoybeansthenextyear
and effectively create a single enterprise farm.
Kansas farmers are likely to reduce grain sor-
ghumandsoybeanacresinfavorofmoredryland
corn. SURE provides additional coverage for
farms that are not diversified and that may en-
courage selection of riskier crops for planting.
There may be other ways to adversely select on
SURE by splitting the ownership between vari-
ous partners so one partner is farming irrigated
acresandtheotherisfarmingdrylandacresonly.
Summary and Conclusions
ACRE will most likely be a supplemental
payment to crop insurance on wheat. Histori-
cally the average crop insurance payment has
exceeded the recasted ACRE payment. SURE
is also a supplement to crop insurance that de-
ducts the ACRE payment. Effectively insured
farmers have two sources of supplemental
payments, ACRE and SURE. A maximum ACRE
payment will likely eliminate a large share of the
SURE payments. However, farmers over the
ACRE payment limit may also collect from
SURE while those farmers under the limit may
lose their SURE payment when ACRE hits the
maximum.
Table 7. Percent of Farms and Number of Farms Participating in ACRE for 2009
Total Program Wheat Corn Grain Sorghum Soybeans
St % Farm # Farms % Farm # Farms % Farm # Farms % Farm # Farms % Farm # Farms
US 7.70% 128,620 7.10% 61,875 8.53% 105,387 4.85% 13,736 9.89% 97,216
WA 24.89% 2.477 26.84% 2,467 1.75% 33 8.70% 2 62.50% 5
OK 24.78% 12,158 25.29% 12,107 15.71% 547 18.12% 2,096 15.67% 621
NE 19.61% 16,367 18.80% 6,758 20.67% 14,915 21.44% 6,090 23.49% 12,788
SD 18.36% 9,164 18.95% 5,420 19.37% 8,397 19.13% 1,357 20.61% 7,588
IL 16.71% 25,960 10.63% 6,516 16.97% 25,893 4.50% 498 17.56% 24,922
IA 11.81% 17,429 7.70% 623 11.85% 17,413 7.14% 64 12.80% 16,268
ND 10.03% 5,529 9.88% 5,320 16.77% 3,193 10.13% 81 26.16% 3,577
IN 9.49% 9,641 10.08% 4,364 9.62% 9,601 8.26% 74 10.02% 9,104
DE 8.78% 305 11.39% 231 8.93% 267 8.33% 18 8.94% 291
ID 7.25% 991 7.58% 878 1.83% 66 1.72% 1 –
OR 7.21% 488 7.74% 488 0.82% 11 12.50% 3 12.50% 2
MI 6.52% 3,241 7.21% 2,177 6.73% 3,135 8.80% 11 6.71% 2,338
OH 6.28% 5,683 6.49% 3,776 6.47% 5,572 7.00% 14 6.71% 5,257
MN 6.14% 5,682 5.56% 1,681 6.38% 5,455 1.43% 2 7.35% 5,299
MO 4.39% 3,269 4.63% 2,413 5.11% 2,925 4.14% 1,143 5.50% 3,055
MT 4.26% 909 4.47% 895 0.92% 19 3.25% 4 3.85% 1
KY 4.08% 1,715 9.98% 1,401 4.21% 1,699 3.49% 107 7.78% 1,579
WI 3.46% 2,601 4.20% 641 3.47% 2,579 4.44% 19 4.48% 1,878
PA 2.49% 647 2.83% 323 2.51% 639 3.95% 24 3.45% 423
CO 1.94% 317 1.59% 215 2.81% 216 1.89% 71 5.38% 12
NY 1.83% 349 3.21% 183 1.84% 348 – 4.16% 142
KS 1.61% 1,603 1.50% 1,405 3.18% 1,107 1.54% 1,203 2.84% 1,182
TN 1.16% 390 1.42% 266 1.52% 377 1.04% 77 1.75% 343
TX 1.03% 930 1.68% 897 1.23% 352 1.17% 27 3.42% 107
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency’s website: www.fsa.usda.gov.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Barnaby: Underwriting Applied to ACRE and SURE 533SURE favors single enterprise farms over
thosewithcropdiversification.Therefore,SURE
will encourage less crop diversification. SURE
may also encourage planting riskier crops be-
cause of the additional coverage provided.
Overlapping ACRE and crop insurance
could be reduced by allowing farmers to delete
the RE endorsement in their crop insurance
contract. Currently, if farmers eliminate their
RE endorsement, they must also eliminate their
YRE endorsement. Allowing farmers to delete
the RE endorsement while retaining the YRE
endorsement will save farmers premium cost
while reducing the overlap with ACRE.
Farmers, especially winter wheat farmers,
hadtheabilitytoadverselyselecton2009ACRE
because of the following items:
1. For 2009 sign-up only, nearly 3 months of the
marketing year for wheat had already passed.
2. Beforesign-up,NASShadpublished4months
of winter wheat yield estimates and their first
combined yield estimate for fall harvested
crops. This was of limited value in states with
yields split between irrigated and dryland.
3. Many winter wheat farmers already had their
crop harvested before sign-up. The a priori
information will continue because winter
wheatfarmerswillhaveagoodyieldestimate
for 2010, if harvest is not completed prior to
the 2010 sign-up. They will also have a good
estimate of the ACRE 5-year Olympic aver-
age yield for 2011.
4. Farmers will be able to continue using a priori
information toelect ACRE for new farmserial
numbers, and once in ACRE, to select crops
for ACRE payments if they over plant their
base acres. They can also change planting
decisions to take advantage of ACRE.
Farmers in states with an irrigated ACRE
practice had almost no a priori information on
yield because only a combined yield was pub-
lished before the 2009 August sign-up. The
combined winter wheat yield will also be pub-
lished before the June 1, 2010 sign-up. The
available a priori information provided towinter
wheatfarmersgivesthemthebestopportunityto
adversely select on ACRE. However, all farmers
will be able to evaluate if ACRE is in or out of
the money at sign-up time or when selecting
crops for payment. Because the premium does
not change to reflect the risk in ACRE, it allows
farmers to select crops most likely to collect
ACRE payments.
Oklahoma, Washington, and Texas wheat
farmers were offered a deep in the money ACRE
contract while Colorado wheat farmers were of-
fered an out of the money ACRE contract for
the same ‘‘premium’’ cost (i.e., 20% of direct
payments for the remaining life of the 2008 Farm
Bill). As expected, large numbers of Oklahoma
and Washington wheat farmers elected ACRE.
Surprisingly, very few Texas wheat farmers se-
lected ACRE. One should use extreme caution
before jumping to the conclusion that the low
Texas participation was caused by a lack of edu-
cation on ACRE. There would have been other
factors, such as impacts on cash rents, re-
quirement to enroll cotton and other crops in ad-
dition towheat in ACRE and a 4-year enrollment
requirement rather than annual enrollment, etc.
Farmers who did not enroll should not as-
sume ACRE will pay in the same states next
year.Itislikelythe2010wheatACREguarantee
will be lower in Oklahoma, Washington, and
Texas. Farmers over time will likely enroll and
onceenrolled,selectcropswithACREcontracts
that are deepin themoney.Adeep inthemoney
option has less chance of expiring worthless
than an out of the money option. Because the
‘‘premium’’ cost does not change with the risk
levelinACRE,itislikelythecostforACREwill
be greater than forecasted. ACRE critics will
likelyclaimthiswascausedbyfraud,waste,and
abuse,wheninfactit’snothingmorethanalack
of underwriting. Without a detailed farmer sur-
veyitwillbedifficulttoargueriskmanagement
was the reason a ‘‘high’’ percentage of wheat
growersselectedACRE.Thedataclearlyshows
farmers had the information to adversely select
on ACRE for wheat, especially winter wheat,
and was likely the major factor influencing
wheat farmers’ ACRE decisions.
Requiring farmers to sign-up for ACRE and
selecting crops for payments before the crops
are planted would greatly reduce the adverse
selection. However, there is no way to prevent
farmers at sign-up or when selecting crops for
payments from selecting crops with ACRE of-
fers that are in the money. However, the earlier
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2010 534crop selection and sign-up date will increase the
p o s s i b i l i t yt h a ta ni nt h em o n e yA C R Eo f f e rw i l l
expire worthless. Unless the participation costs
are allowed to adjust to reflect the change in risk
in ACRE anearliersign-up dateislikely thebest
method for reducing but not eliminating adverse
selection.
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